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Abstract
I study the moral hazard problem where an agent can create an extra
instance of effort and potentially improve bad realizations of the outcome
before the principal observes it. The agent cannot hide the outcome of his
effort, but just the way he achieved it. Findings are that both, principal and
agent, value the option of improving the outcome in case of a bad realization if
doing so is cheap. I also find that contracted effort is not always decreasing in
its cost. Finally, if the creation of the extra instance can cause a punishment
for the principal, and if that punishment is sufficiently big, the principal will
avoid writing contracts that incentive effort only on the extra chance.
JEL classification: D82, D86.
Keywords: Moral Hazard, Asymmetric Information, Contract Theory, Sec-
ond Chance.
1 Introduction
In real life we can think of many situations in which principals face agents who,
while unable to hide the outcome, can hide the way it was achieved (for example,
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when and how much effort was exerted). The agent may have ways to achieve the
outcome that are completely unknown to the principal when offering the contract.
In this paper, I introduce a moral hazard model in which the agent takes sequen-
tial decisions. In the beginning, the principal offers a contract, which is contingent
on the final outcome. Later the agent exerts effort, observes the outcome of his ef-
fort, and in case the outcome is bad, can decide to exert further effort in an attempt
to obtain a better outcome. A key piece of the model is that effort is cumulative,
that is, the probability of success is higher the more effort has been exerted in total.
This setup allows us to consider different situations. For example, the agent
might at first exert low levels of effort, with the hope of having a good outcome,
and knowing that in case this bet goes wrong, he will have another chance to work
hard and increase the chances of delivering. Consider the example of a honey dealer
buying from cheap low reputation suppliers. If he has enough time until delivery, he
might gamble with the cheap suppliers, and buy from more expensive and reliable
suppliers only if he received low-quality products from the cheap ones. This decreases
the chances for the principal observing a good outcome, when compared to going
to the good suppliers from the beginning, as the agent has a higher probability of
success, and higher chances to fix a unlikely bad outcome.
The extra chance is, however, not necessarily a bad thing for the principal.
Indeed, it might even reduce the cost of effort, by introducing the option of gam-
bling at first. In this article, I show that the principal, under certain conditions,
designs contracts that make the agent gamble even in scenarios without moral haz-
ard. However, moral hazard increases the agency costs significantly compared to
the standard agency model (it is easier for the agent to hide what his actions are
because of his larger set of options). I show that these facts create non-convexities
and non-monotonicities in the implementation of effort as a function of its cost.
Finally, I study the case where the extra chance represents an undesired activity,
which can trigger later a punishment to the principal if caught. I show that if
the penalty is big enough, the principal will never contract a strategy involving
gambling (no effort and later trying to fix an adverse outcome). As the agent does
not suffer the consequences other than the cost of the extra chance,1 the agency costs
increase substantially in the regions where gambling is the agent’s best response,
and therefore no effort is contracted in a broader set of parameters than in the case
without the punishment.
In Section 2, I review the literature that relates to the problem presented in this
1“The Justice Department has lost the will and ability to prosecute top corporate execu-
tives. They focus on settlements with corporations for money...”, Jessie Eisinger in an interview
with Knowledge@Wharton on August 2017 - http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/why-
wrongdoing-executives-are-rarely-prosecuted/.
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paper. In Section 3, I present the baseline model with its efficiency implications. In
Section 4, I describe how a cost for the principal, of having used the second chance,
affects the implementation of strategies involving the use of that extra chance with
and without moral hazard. Finally, I conclude in Section 5.
2 Related Literature
The traditional framework used in moral hazard consists on an agent that has to
perform a task for a principal, and the principal cannot observe the effort exerted
by the agent. For that reason, the principal sets a payment schedule contingent on
the outcome. Examples of this can be found for example in Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005), Laffont and Martimort (2002), and Salanie´ (2005). The model introduced
in this paper, incorporates a second chance to exert effort by the agent, before the
principal observes the outcome.
The literature so far has a set of different branches to which this model can relate.
In particular, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) introduced a pure moral hazard model
in which the agent has to exert effort a number of times before the principal com-
pensates him. In their work the authors’ model has the following timeline: in each
of the N periods of the game the agent has to exert effort, and after each of those
periods there will be an instant realization that cannot be obscured by the agent.
At the end of the N periods, the principal will be able to observe the whole history
of realizations and then proceed to compensate the agent. They conclude that the
optimal contract involves aggregation of realizations and linear compensation on this
aggregated performance along with constant effort from the agent. While they were
pointing to show that not always it is necessary to use all the information to reach
optimal compensation schemes and that sometimes simple functions, as observed in
the real world, turn out to be optimal solutions for the principal, I focus more on
the behavior of the agent trying to exploit the fact of having more than one period
to achieve a final output, and I do not provide more information to the principal
than a single outcome. Besides, in my framework effort is cumulative, and the agent
can stop working after the first period if desired.
Another one is multitasking (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), as the two actions
are different (as effort is cumulative) and both go in the direction of increasing the
principal’s utility. Even though the complementarity of both actions is a similarity
with the model presented in this article, the timing is quite different. As effort
is cumulative in my model, the first time the agent exerts effort impacts on the
productivity of effort in the extra chance; however, the effort exerted during this
second chance does not affect the productivity of the first one.
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Zhao (2008) provides a model in which two contracting parties might be unaware
about their own or the counterpart’s strategy set. This was extended by articles like
Auster (2013) and von Thadden and Zhao (2014), although in these situations,
usually the agent is unaware of some of his options, and the principal decides to
reveal — or not — information about those to the agent through the contract. The
model of this paper considers a similar framework, however it departs from the
main stream by considering that: the principal might be unaware of the agent’s
strategies, the principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it contract, and therefore the agent
has no way to pass information to the principal, and finally, I explore the possibility
of the principal removing some of the agent’s strategies by using deadlines.
Varas (2017) provides a model to explain why contracts exhibit low turnover
rates and deferred compensation. In his setup, managers can shorten the time they
take to carry out a project by sacrificing quality. The principal, therefore, delays
compensation to the future, so the quality of the project is revealed. This frame-
work is related to the one introduced in this paper in the sense that the agent can
exert actions that can create costs for the principal in the future. However, Varas’
setup is intended for longer principal-agent relationships, in which termination is
fundamental in the stationary contracts. In this article, I focus on a short-term
relationship between a principal and an agent. This can be applied to suppliers,
contractors, etc.
There is another branch of the literature that studies fraud using counterfeit
signals, but with a very important difference: the literature considers the problem
as pure adverse selection or instead as moral hazard followed by adverse selection,
in which the agent can choose the signal to present to the principal about a previous
realization which in turn can depend on some effort measure. In this literature, we
find for example Maggi and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1995) which propose a model in which
the agent must reveal to the principal its true type. Crocker and Morgan (1998),
and Crocker and Slemrod (2007) incorporate a first stage in which the agent must
indeed exert an effort level, and later he can decide to reveal or not the outcome
(that is, reveal the true outcome or a false one).
Clausen (2013) introduces a novel concept that extends the previous models
incorporating the fact that the agent can decide to obscure the true outcome from
the principal, but he cannot control what it is going to be the signal that indeed
the principal observes. Clausen considers a model in which the agent exerts effort
once, and later there are successive accurate signals about the outcome realizations
that are privately observed by the agent each time before the principal. The agent
can then decide to counterfeit each signal for a better one deceiving the principal.
The type of situations that can be represented by this model are different from the
ones I try to describe. Indeed, Clausen mentions internet advertising click fraud, in
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which companies exaggerate the reported clicks for internet advertising, or security
companies that hide breaches, to obscure the fact of having failed in their mission. A
crucial difference with respect to the model I present in this work is that the agent,
instead of sending a counterfeit signal to the principal, can exert effort and de facto
improve the outcome. He cannot deceive the principal by obscuring the outcome.
Finally, the gambling for resurrection literature (Calveras, Ganuza, and Hauk,
2004, Thaler and Johnson, 1990) might also seem to be close to this work. Never-
theless, there is a key difference. While the model presented in this paper focuses
on the effects of having the possibility of improving a poor outcome after the first
effort was exerted, the gambling for resurrection focuses on the risk attitudes of
agents given a previous event. The classical example is what Thaler and Johnson
(1990) call the break-even effect, as when agents with previous losses will take risky
opportunities to recover even if those carry even more risk. I am more interested
in how the possibility of additional effort can change the agent’s behavior from the
beginning and how this affects the incentive scheme design.
3 The Model
The classical moral hazard models in the literature considers a principal that makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a contract to an agent. This contract establishes a
payment schedule, from the principal to the agent, conditional on publicly observed
outcomes. The outcomes are stochastic, but their distribution is influenced by the
amount of effort the agent has exerted. This effort is not observable, and that is
precisely what creates the moral hazard problem. I extend this classical model by
giving the agent the opportunity to improve a bad outcome after he has already
exerted some effort, but before it is observed by the principal.
Principal and agent are both assumed to be risk neutral. I assume further
that the agent is cash constrained. First principal and agent sign the contract,
establishing payments w ∈ {wl, wh} contingent on the observed output y ∈ {yl, yh}.
The effort the agent can exert is denoted by e ∈ {0, 1}, which impacts the probability
of obtaining a high output yh. This probability depends on the amount of effort
exerted in the present period and the past. Let (e1, e2) be the agent’s strategy that
works in the following way: the agent in the first period will exert e1 and later
will observe an interim accurate signal yˆ ∈ {yl, yh}. If yˆ = yh, the agent will not
exert more effort whatsoever (as the outcome cannot be improved) and the publicly
observed outcome is y = yˆ = yh. However, if yˆ = yl then what happens next
depends on the agent’s choice of e2. If e2 = 0, there is no second lottery and the
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previous outcome is maintained. The principal observes y = yl and pays wl.
2 If
e2 = 1 the outcome y is drawn from a lottery that assigns a higher probability of
occurrence to yh than in the previous period, because the total amount of exerted
effort has increased, and then capturing this model’s feature that effort is considered
cumulative. A contract under this setup is a wage schedule that induces the agent
to choose a particular effort strategy. Without any loss of generality and for the
sake of simplicity I will assume from now on that yl = 0.
The utility function of the principal is up = yi − wi, i = h, l, while the utility
function of the agent is ua = wi − e1 − βe2, i = h, l, where β > 0 represents the
cost of exerting effort to improve upon the already realized outcome. Let the agent’s
reservation utility be u = 0. Furthermore, w0 ≥ 0, as the agent was assumed to be
cash constrained.
Effort influences the probability of having a good outcome. This probability may
take the values p0, p1, and p2 defined as:
• p0 > 0 is the probability of success when no effort was exerted in the past, nor
the present.
• p1 > p0 is the probability of success when effort was exerted only once.
• p2 = 1 is the probability of success when effort is exerted now and in the past.
Note that the subscripts indicate how many times the agent has exerted effort
at that time. It is also worth noting that the probability of having a good outcome
after the first period can only be p0 or p1, while in the second lottery it can be p1 or
p2. Letting p2 = 1 allows focusing on the significance of p0 and p1. Finally, p0 is the
probability of success without exerting any effort, and as that it helps to measure
how much the effort can add to the outcome.
The complexity of the task is captured by p1. If p1 is high, for a given p0, then
exerting effort once is enough to have the goal achieved, and therefore it represents
a simple task, but if p1 is very low, then exerting effort once is most likely not to be
enough to achieve the desired goal, representing a complex task.
The model gives the agent the alternative to delay effort if convenient. If the
agent observes a bad interim outcome, exerting effort to fix that outcome implies the
same probability of success as having exerted effort at the beginning (p1). Moreover,
when choosing the strategy, the probability of success of (0, 1) is strictly higher when
compared to (1, 0). Note that the agent would delay effort, not because of impatience
2I assume a second lottery only if effort is exerted in the second period, while for the first one,
no effort still has a positive probability of success. This assumption brings tremendous gains in
simplicity and parsimony to the model. I have verified that giving the agent a free draw when
e2 = 0 does not change the main conclusions of the model.
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= 1
Figure 1: Agent’s decision tree.
(which is not modeled), but because of the value of the option of exerting the effort in
the future. In this model, delaying effort increases the chances of success compared
to exerting effort only in the first period. Of course this option is valuable as long
as its cost (β) is not too high. An illustration of the decisions the agent can make
and their impact on the outcome can be observed in Figure 1.
In the following subsections, I find the contracts under full information, with
an unaware principal with moral hazard, and with an aware principal also in the
presence of moral hazard. Later I present a discussion on the inefficiencies created
by the information asymmetry.
Full Information
Without any information asymmetry, the maximization problem is equivalent to the
one the agent would solve if owning the project. Note that removing all information
asymmetry implies the principal is aware of the existence of both chances the agent
can use to exert effort. As such, she considers the direct trade-off between the
expected outcome and the cost of each strategy, allowing us to disregard the wage
schedule. Following this setup has many advantages. Firstly it allows identifying
the welfare maximizing strategies for the parameters of the problem. Secondly, it
allows to set up very explicitly the best response for the agent in the problem with
moral hazard. The maximization problem under full information is:
max
(e1,e2)
pe1yh − e1 + e2(1− pe1)(pe1+1yh − β) (1)
Lemma 1. There exist β
1
< β1 such that with full information:
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1. ∀ β > β
1
, (0, 1) is never contracted.
2. ∀ β < β1, (1, 0) is never contracted.
Proof. In Appendix A, I find the strategies that are implemented for different levels
of yh, given β. It can be established that β1 = p1/[(1 − p0) − p1(1 − p1)] and
β1 = 1/(p1 − p0) are such that the lemma is satisfied. Note that β1 can be higher
than 1, if p1 > (3−
√
5)/2 and p0 > (1− p1)2.
Lemma 1 shows that, if the cost of exerting effort in the extra chance is too high,
it is never optimal to use it. In the same direction, if the cost of this extra chance
is low, and if it is worth to exert some effort, this chance is to be used. Moreover,
if this extra chance is very cheap, effort is going to be implemented in the form of
(0, 1) even for very low values of yh. Another interesting implication of Lemma 1 is
that as p1 − p0 → 0, or in words, either the task is so hard that needs effort twice,
or the task is easy enough that effort (once or twice) adds little, β
1
→ p1/(1− p1)2
while β1 →∞, so while (0, 1) is still going to be implemented, (1, 0) is going to be
implemented only for an infinitely large cost of creating the second chance.
Lemma 1 considerably facilitates the computation of the contract with full infor-
mation, as it reduces the strategies to consider within intervals of β. The solution
to the problem stated in (1) is represented in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The contract under perfect information is given by:
1. For β < β
1
,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ βp1 .
(b) (0, 1) for β
p1
≤ yh ≤ 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)(1−p1) .
(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
2. For β
1
< β < β1,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1+(1−p1)β1−p0 .
(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
3. For β1 < β.
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1p1−p0 .
(b) (1, 0) for 1
p1−p0 ≤ yh ≤ β.
(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
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The contract under full information is represented in Figure 2. Note that it
results from the possibility of delaying effort that at least some effort is contracted
even for very low levels of yh. This is not only true because close to the origin the
future effort is cheap, as the fact that even for values of β greater than 1 this is still
the case, but because of the value of the option of delaying effort.
At higher levels of yh we observe that for low levels of β the strategy involving
exploiting the option of exerting future effort is preferred, and as β increases then
(1, 1) becomes optimal. This is because even though for those levels of β exerting
the option is still profitable, as β is now higher, the agent tries to diminish the
probability of having to use that option, and he achieves that by exerting effort in
the first period. If yh is high enough, by increasing β, we only disregard the use of
the option (as it will never give positive expected profits), while if yh is lower, then
from (1, 1) by increasing β, the optimal strategy will be to exert no effort at all.
This is another very graphical way to observe the value of the option of delaying
effort, as for a fixed yh the strategy (1, 1) changes to (0, 0) instead of moving to (1, 0)
as β increases.
β
yh
β1β1
(1, 1)
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
Figure 2: Contract under perfect information.
Finally, we can observe that while e2 does not increase in the cost of the second
effort (β), we also observe that, for some levels of yh, e1 is not monotonic in β. It is
surprising that e1 is exerted optimally at all for levels below yh = 1/(p1 − p0). To
pin down the cause of this, recall the previous discussion: setting e1 = 1 affects e2
in two ways. First, it makes it less likely that the second chance is going to be used,
and second, it increases the expected revenue for doing so, by increasing the chance
of success of e2 = 1 from p1 < 1 to p2 = 1. When increasing β, and yh is such that
the strategy moves from (1, 1) to (0, 0), the increasing cost of the second chance has
9
destroyed the benefits of this complementarity, leading to the optimality of no effort
at all.
Moral Hazard and Unaware Principal
In this subsection, I portray the situation in which the principal does not know
about the possibility of the extra chance.
This unaware principal will propose the classical textbook moral hazard contract,
with wh = 1/(p1 − p0) for a good observed outcome, and wl = 0 otherwise.
We can use the optimal strategies under full information to describe the best
response of the agent, by considering wh = 1/(p1 − p0). The principal will offer
this wage level if and only if yh ≥ p1/(p1 − p0)2. Replacing wh in the agent’s best
response, we obtain the strategies followed by the agent. These depend on the value
of β. Note that while (1, 0) and (0, 0) are the strategies the principal expects, (0, 1)
and (1, 1) strategies the principal does not expect, as she is unaware of them.
It can be shown (Appendix A) that, for wh = 1/(p1 − p0), the agent will never
choose (0, 0). Moreover, it can be shown that there exists thresholds on β such that
the agent will choose (0, 1), (1, 1) or (1, 0) within different intervals for β. Each of
these strategies will lead to different levels of outcome for the principal:
Strategy Exp. outcome for the principal Exp. outcome by unaware principal
(0, 1) [p0 + p1(1− p0)]
(
yh − 1p1−p0
)
p1
(
yh − 1p1−p0
)
(1, 1) yh − 1p1−p0 p1
(
yh − 1p1−p0
)
(1, 0) p1
(
yh − 1p1−p0
)
p1
(
yh − 1p1−p0
)
Table 1: Principal’s expected outcome.
In Table 1, we observe that for each of these scenarios, the principal is at least
as good as she expect to be in the traditional model without the extra chance.
However, that is not all. The agent also benefits from this, as he obtains larger
rents which are created by the extra chance. More specifically, the principal could
have induced the same strategies with a much lower wage, keeping a higher share of
the outcome.
It can be shown that the agent’s gains are always positive, given his optimal
chosen strategy for the parameters involved (probabilities of success and future cost
of effort, β).
10
Strategy wh - unaware principal Optimal wh Agent’s gains
(0, 1) 1
p1−p0
β
p1
1
p1−p0 −
β
p1
(1, 0) 1
p1−p0
1
p1−p0 0
(1, 1)∗ 1
p1−p0
1−β(p1−p0)
(1−p0)(1−p1)
1
p1−p0 −
1−β(p1−p0)
(1−p0)(1−p1)
(1, 1)∗∗ 1
p1−p0
1+(1−p1)β
1−p0
1
p1−p0 −
1+(1−p1)β
1−p0
Table 2: Rents distribution with unaware principal. ∗ when β < β1, and ∗∗ when
β ≥ β1.
Moral Hazard
Under moral hazard, I consider the traditional participation constraint and the in-
centive compatibility constraint ensuring that the agent accepts to sign the contract
and chooses the desired strategy. The cost for the principal is represented by the
wages wh and wl for the good and bad outcome respectively. Recall that the agent is
assumed to be cash constrained, and therefore I set immediately wl = 0. The prin-
cipal’s maximization problem when facing asymmetric information is represented
by:
max
wh,e1,e2
pe1(yh − wh) + e2(1− pe1)pe1+1(yh − wh) (2)
s.t. pe1wh − e1 + e2(1− pe1)(pe1+1wh − β) ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(eˆ1,eˆ2)
peˆ1wh − eˆ1 + eˆ2(1− peˆ1)(peˆ1+1wh − β)
The incentive compatibility is given by the solution to the problem with full
information. The only difference is that it is necessary to replace yh with wh, as the
agent is now getting only wh instead of the whole outcome. This gives immediately
the optimal incentive compatible wages for a given β and outcome distribution. As
such β
1
and β1 from Lemma 1 are also critical points for the case with moral hazard,
as for the principal, it is impossible to implement a contract involving (1, 0) or (0, 1)
between those parameters, no matter the wage. Having the incentive compatible
wage for each strategy, and having the implementable contracts as a function of
β, it is just a matter of comparing expected profits of implementing each strategy,
leading to the first result in the presence of moral hazard, expressed in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. There exist β
2
(< β
1
) and β2 (> β1) such that under asymmetric infor-
mation:
1. ∀ β > β
2
, (0, 1) is never implemented.
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2. ∀ β < β2, (1, 0) is never implemented.
Proof. Comparing the expected profits of implementing each strategy, given the
wages are incentive compatible, it happens that there exist yh such that (0, 1) is
optimal only if
β < β
2
=
p21
p0 + p1 − (1− p1)[p21 + p20 − p20p1]− p0p1(3− p1)
,
while there exists yh such that (1, 0) is optimal only if
β > β2 =
p1(1− p0)
(p1 − p0)2 .
It can be shown after some algebra that β
2
< β
1
since p1p0(1− p0)(1− p1)2 > 0 and
β1 < β2 since 0 < p0 < p1 < 1.
An important implication of Lemma 2 is that the contracts implementing (0, 1)
and (1, 0) have more restrictive requirements over β than when compared to the case
with perfect information. An important remark is that, even though the β2s found
in Lemma 2 play the same role that the β1s played in the case without moral hazard,
the β1 are still very important for the case with asymmetric information. They now
affect directly the incentive compatibility constraint, as they define the regions for
which the agent will never play (1, 0) or (0, 1), no matter wh. The contract under
moral hazard is described for five different intervals for β as stated in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Under asymmetric information, the contract with a cash constrained
agent is given by:
1. For β < β
2
,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ β
(
p0+p1(1−p0)
(1−p0)p21
)
.
(b) (0, 1) for β
(
p0+p1(1−p0)
(1−p0)p21
)
≤ yh,
and yh ≤ 1[(1−p0)(1−p1)]2 − β
[
p1−p0
[(1−p0)(1−p1)]2 +
p0+p1(1−p0)
p1(1−p0)(1−p1)
]
(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
2. For β
2
< β < β
1
,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)2(1−p1) .
(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
3. For β
1
< β < β1,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ 1+(1−p1)β(1−p0)2 .
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(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
4. For β1 < β < β2,
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ β1−p0 .
(b) (1, 1) otherwise.
5. For β2 < β.
(a) (0, 0) for yh ≤ p1(p1−p0)2 .
(b) (1, 0) for p1
(p1−p0)2 ≤ yh ≤
β(p1−p0)−p1
(1−p1)(p1−p0) .
(c) (1, 1) otherwise.
Focusing the attention on the first interval for β, we observe how (0, 1) becomes
optimal for a broader set of parameter values than compared to the case with full
information. Note that the denominator in the interval is quite small, leading to
a very big intercept on the frontier between (0, 1) and (1, 1) as optimal contracts.
Looking at Figure 3 there is a very interesting fringe of yh about the middle. There
are some values of yh for which, by increasing β, we have the following transition:
starts with (0, 1), then moves to (0, 0), followed by (1, 1) to finally come back to
(0, 0).
Proposition 3. With information asymmetries there exist yh such that e2 is not
monotonically decreasing in β.
Proof. The proof follows directly Proposition 2 and Lemma 2. Let
yh ∈ Υ :=
(
1− β
2
(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)2(1− p1) ,
1− β
1
(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)2(1− p1)
)
The set Υ is nonempty since β
2
< β
1
. From Proposition 2, it can be seen that
between β
2
and β
1
the optimal contract will change from (0, 0) to (1, 1), as the slope
of the frontier between both is decreasing in β. It can be observed as well, that for
β increasing above β
1
the optimal contract will move from (1, 1) to a contract for
which e2 is zero, as the frontier between both has always a positive slope.
The set of (0, 0) is not convex, which follows directly from Proposition 2 where
the slope of the frontier of (0, 0) changes from positive to negative and later to
positive again. At very low levels of β, (0, 1) is implemented following the same
logic it had in the case with full information. The second chance, being so cheap,
makes it preferable to bet all in taking the risk and later try to fix any bad outcome.
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βyh
β2β21
(1, 1)
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
Figure 3: Contract with moral hazard.
As β gets closer to β
2
(for the same level of yh) the extra chance becomes more
costly, so it would be better to avoid it. The logic behind the solution with full
information to achieve that was to implement (1, 1) instead, in order to decrease the
probability of using the extra chance. However, as β is still low, the agent would
prefer to deviate to gamble with (0, 1), and therefore the incentives to make him
stick to (1, 1) become too high. In this situation, the principal decides to implement
(0, 0). As β increases further, approaching now β
1
, the principal knows that the
incentives for the agent to deviate from (1, 1) decrease, diminishing the agency costs,
so she will start implementing (1, 1) again. The lower yh inside the fringe, the closer
the β needs to be to β
1
. In fact in the limit, it will coincide and will implement
(1, 1) just in β = β
1
. When β is above β
1
, the logic of the model follows the case
with full information. (1, 1) is implemented instead (0, 1) as β becomes larger, to
decrease the possibility of paying the cost of the extra chance, and as β increases
even further, the principal will implement strategies with e2 = 0, and setting e1 = 1
or e1 = 0 depending on the level of yh. While, as expected, introducing agency costs
in the model changes the optimal solution for the principal, the information rents
around β
1
create the non-convexity in the model. Note that to the left of β
1
the
agent has the option to deviate between three contracts, while to the right of β
1
he
endogenously will never choose (0, 1), so the principal does not require to provide
incentives to prevent that deviation.
As it was the case under full information, we observe that e1 is not monotonic on
β for some values of yh either. This follows the same rationale previously discussed
in the sense that, increasing β, the benefits of the complementarity between e1 and
e2 are offset by the higher cost, requiring higher values of yh to justify this strategy.
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The other comparisons that can be made between the cases with full or imperfect
information are in line with what would be expected in the traditional models of
moral hazard and are illustrated in Figure 4. First, we observe that (0, 0) expands
against all the other contracts. Besides the change in convexity of the set of (0, 0)
discussed previously for the contract with imperfect information, the change in the
extension of the sets implementing (0, 1) and (1, 0) is clear. In particular, the change
in the slope of the frontier between (0, 1) and (1, 1) makes it very hard (require very
high values of yh) to implement (1, 1) when β falls below β2. It is remarkable that
β
2
is not required to be below 1 for this to happen, so this case happens even when
the creation of this extra chance is relatively more costly than exerting effort on the
first chance.
The conclusions of Lemma 2 can also be observed in Figure 4. Note how larger
the interval of [β, β], for which only (0, 0) or (1, 1) contracts are implemented, is in
when compared to the case with full information. This happens because without full
information, it is easier for the agent to deviate from one of those contracts to the
other, or from (1, 1) to (1, 0), and therefore the principal will prefer to implement
contracts that give him better information about what was done by the agent. When
β is very high (above β2), the principal can incentivate the agent to not deviate
from his strategy, starting to implement (1, 0) again. Basically to the left of β
2
the
principal is resigned not to implement (1, 1) when it would be optimal.
β
yh
β2β2
β1β1
(1, 1)
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
Figure 4: Contracts with full (dashed) and imperfect (solid) information.
A final conclusion that can be made from the comparison between the contracts
with and without moral hazard is that the space in which e2 is used decreases
considerably because of the expansion of (0, 1) to regions for which (1, 1) was optimal.
Also by the change in the slope of the frontier between (1, 0) and (1, 1) from the case
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with full to imperfect information, it is clear that not only (0, 0) is to be implemented
for a broader set of parameters, but (1, 0) as well, although for higher values of yh
and β.
The study of the scenario with moral hazard shows that, when the agent has a
low cost for creating the extra instance, it is very costly for the principal to dissuade
him from shirking in the beginning with the hope of fixing a bad outcome in future
scenarios.
Although I assumed that the principal is not concerned with the way in which
the task was achieved (or not), but only if it was, this does not rule out potential
costs for her. Indeed, having more strategies to evaluate, creates higher agency
costs, as according to the model, by making harder for the principal to infer the
strategy chosen by the agent. Furthermore, we observe that when the cost of cre-
ating the extra chance for the agent is low, it is too expensive for the principal to
incentivize the strategy that would be the optimal with full information, and she
simply implements the (0, 1) strategy for a wide set of values of yh.
4 Externalities
In this section, I assume that the principal cares about how the outcome was
achieved. Some of the analogies previously made with the strategies that the agent
can follow imply risky financial activities or dubious process manipulation. Even
further, creating the extra chance can be sometimes illegal (forcing workers to work
extra hours when it is not allowed), or incurring in practices that might be censored
by a regulator or the industry.
These costs might be the expected punishment the principal faces if caught by
the regulator. Consider the recent case in the automobile industry, in which many
brands modified the computers in their motors to pass the emission regulation tests.
If the people in charge knew that software like this could be produced, that has a
high probability of succeeding to passing the test, at a very cheap cost (in the model
this would be very high p1 with a very low β) they have strong incentives to take
their chances with the software. If the expected cost of the transgression is low, then
the principal might contract strategies in which gambling is encouraged, obtaining
higher profits: if β is low, the required compensation is also low, and therefore the
principal obtains a bigger surplus.
In what follows, I will assume that exerting e2, if detected by the regulator,
triggers a punishment to the principal, such that its expected cost, if e2 was exerted,
is ξ. The immediate effect we can depict is that the strategies involving the second
effort will see their expected return decreased, and therefore the strategies without
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e2 will be optimal for a wider set of parameters.
The introduction of an externality cost, under perfect information, that is if the
principal could indeed choose the optimal level of effort to maximize aggregated
surplus, has a similar effect than facing a massive cost of e2, or β. The detailed
derivation of this version of the model is left for Appendix B.1. Figure 5 contains
the main implications of introducing an externality in the case without moral hazard.
To start with, the strategy involving shirking and exerting effort when facing a
bad outcome becomes less optimal than when there is no externality. Exerting effort
in both periods becomes preferred over (0, 1), but it is nevertheless implemented less
than in the original model, losing against (0, 0) and (1, 0). As the shape of the plot
remains more or less equal, we obtain the first result of introducing the externality.
The variables β and β are shifted to the left along with the plot, exactly in the value
of ξ. This implies that the strategy (0, 1) might end up being completely wiped off
in the absence of moral hazard for some value of ξ high enough, this threshold is
stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 4. With full information, if the cost ξ exceeds p1/[(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)]
then (0, 1) is never optimal.
Proof. In Appendix B.1 can be observed that (0, 1) is implemented only for values
of β between 0 and p1/[(1 − p0) − p1(1 − p1)] − ξ. As β ≥ 0 then for ξ > p1/[(1 −
p0)− p1(1− p1)] the set for which (0, 1) results optimal is empty.
β
yh
(1, 1)
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
Figure 5: Contract with full information and externality.
Now when considering moral hazard, I assume as usual that the principal cannot
observe the agent’s actions. Again, the introduction of the externality should carry
similar consequences of those that higher values of β would carry.
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The detailed solution of this problem can be found in Appendix B.2. As expected,
now the strategies (0, 1) and (1, 1) have higher potential cost for the principal, and
therefore they turn out to be optimal in a smaller parameter space when compared
to the problem without the cost of ξ. The effect on the model with moral hazard
is not identical to the one that happens in the version with perfect information
though. Now, because of the agency problem, the plot does not move to the left as
it happened before. Note that the values of β
1
and β1 are not affected at all.
A similarity, though, with the full information case is that there is a value for ξ
that makes (0, 1) never optimal.
Proposition 5. If the cost ξ is higher or equal than
p1
(1− p0)(1− p1)[(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)]
then (0, 1) is never optimal.
Proof. In Appendix B.2 it can be observed that (0, 1) is implemented only for values
of beta such that
β ∈
[
0,
p21 + [p1(1− p0)(1− p1){(1− p1)p1 − (1− p0)}]ξ
[p0 + (1− p0)p1](1− p0)(1− p1) + (p1 − p0)p21
]
As β ≥ 0 then for ξ ≥ p1/{(1− p0)(1− p1)[(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)]} the set for which
(0, 1) is optimal is empty.
β
yh
(1, 1)
(0, 1)
(0, 0)
(1, 0)
Figure 6: Contract under moral hazard and externality.
The strategy (1, 1) can never be ruled out for a finite externality cost, because
even if ξ > 1/(p1− p0), which would make β1 negative, there can always be found a
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yh big enough such that it will be optimal to exert effort in both opportunities. As
a consequence, if the regulator would like to prevent second effort in any scenario, it
would need, as expected, to relate the punishment (ξ) to yh, such that the principal
avoids implementing strategies with (−, 1) at all. Furthermore, this would make the
principal to implement shorter deadlines more often.
The agency costs are aggravated, which is reflected in Figure 6. In the region
where the non-convexity of (0, 0) occurs, with the externality these costs are higher.
As the principal is bearing the costs ξ and not the agent, the principal contracts
strategies involving (0, 0) more aggressively to the left of β
1
.
5 Conclusions
I propose a model of moral hazard in which the agent has more than one chance to
exert effort before revealing the output to the principal. The agent, after exerting
some effort, observes an interim signal and then decides whether to make more effort
to improve an adverse outcome or to deliver the outcome immediately.
Both agent and principal value this extra chance. I show how this situation
creates extra rents that are split between principal and agent, when the principal
offers the classical contract without the second chance, to an agent that can actually
create this extra chance. Moreover, I find that when the principal knows about the
extra chance, and there is no information asymmetry, both agent and principal value
the possibility of fixing a bad outcome as an option, by being able to shirk at the
beginning, if convenient, and later trying to fix a potentially adverse outcome.
However, once the information asymmetries are introduced, implementing a
never shirking contract, and when the cost of creating the additional instance is
low, happens for very high values of positive outcomes only. One of the main find-
ings of the model is that with moral hazard the effort in the extra chance is not
necessarily decreasing on its cost, existing values of output for which an increase in
the cost of the second chance might increase the effort contracted in that second
chance.
Finally, I study what happens if the extra chance can bring later consequences,
and therefore costs, to the principal. This is done in order to adapt the model to
situations in which this extra chance represents the use of illegal techniques to deliver
the outcome as promised. I find that this possible cost for the principal causes that
the strategies that do not involve the use of this extra chance become optimal for a
wider set of parameters. Moreover, the principal will write contracts that incentive
effort in the first period where with full information would have contracted effort
only in the second chance, with the hopes of decreasing the probability of the agent
19
using the second chance.
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Appendix
A Baseline Model
A.1 Perfect Information
In this appendix I solve the problem with perfect information. For simplicity and
without loss of generality I assume eh = 1. For the same reason, I solve the problem
assuming the agent owns the firm, or conversely, the principal exerts the effort.
Because of this assumption, the maximization problem lacks considerations about
the wage schedule. The maximization problem is:
max
(e1,e2)
p(e1)yh − e1 + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)yh − β}
There is no need to compare all the strategies for a given pair of β and yh. For
example, if e1 = 1, we know that if yh ≥ β, then the agent will always exert effort
for e2, and therefore the strategy (1, 0) will never be followed.
3 Conversely, if yh < β
the agent will never exert effort in his second chance, and therefore the strategy
(1, 1) should never be considered. We can say even more, as yh < β ⇒ yh < βp1 , we
can also discard (0, 1) from the possibilities.4 With this information, we can define a
correspondence, relating values of β to strategies to be implemented for some value
of yh.
The agent will stick with a strategy involving e2 6= 0 if, after observing yˆ = 0, the
return of exerting effort again is positive. In practical terms (0, 1) will be optimal
after observing yˆ = 0 if and only if p1yh > β1. In the same way (1, 1) will be optimal
after observing yˆ = 0 if and only if yh > β1.
From these two constraints, we obtain two critical values of yh:
β
p1
and β. These
critical points can be described in the diagram in Figure 7.
3Note that if yh ≥ β, given yˆ = 0 it is always optimal to exert e2 = 1, as the revenues (yh) are
higher that the cost of that effort.
4Note that if yh < β then, given e1, the expected revenues of e2 = 1 are p1yh, which is lower
than β.
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0(0, 0), (1, 0)
β
(0, 0), (1, 0)
(1, 1) β
p1
(0, 0), (1, 0)
(0, 1), (1, 1) yh
Figure 7: Strategies to be considered, for some level of yh, given β.
Figure 7 shows which strategies are profitable as a function of yh given β. We
can say more though. If it is rational to exert effort in the second period, given
effort in the first period (which implies that the probability of success is now 1),
then not exerting effort in the second period given effort in the first period will
never be played. In the same way it can be argued that, if it is rational to exert
effort in the second period, given no effort in the first period (which implies that the
probability of success is now p1), then it is not rational to exert no effort in the first
period without exerting effort in the second period. The new graphical description
is in Figure 8.
0
(0, 0), (1, 0)
β
(0, 0), (1, 1)
β
p1
(0, 1), (1, 1)
yh
Figure 8: Strategies that can be implemented for different levels of yh.
Comparing the profits between each pair, we can find the intervals that are
relevant.
1. For the first interval (0, 0) versus (≥) (1, 0),
p0yh ≥ p1yh − 1
yh ≤ 1
p1 − p0
2. For the second interval (0, 0) versus (≥) (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh − 1− (1− p1)β
1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0 ≥ yh
3. For the final interval (0, 1) versus (≥) (1, 1),
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p0yh + (1− p0)[p1yh − β] ≥ yh − 1− (1− p1)β
1− (p1 − p0)β ≥ yh(1− p0)(1− p1)
1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1) ≥ yh
The next step is to check which of the strategy sets is empty.
0
(0, 0) (1, 0)
β
(0, 0) (1, 1)
β
p1
(0, 1) (1, 1)
yh1
p1−p0
1+(1−p1)β
1−p0
1−β(p1−p0)
(1−p0)(1−p1)
Figure 9: Strategies that can be implemented for different levels of yh.
Name the intervals from left to right as A, B, C, etc.
It is clear that set A is nonempty. For B to be nonempty, it is necessary that:
1
p1 − p0 ≤ β
For C to be nonempty, it is necessary:
β ≤ 1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0
(1− p0)β ≤ 1 + (1− p1)β
β ≤ 1
p1 − p0
From here we get that B and C are mutually exclusive sets. Now for D to be
nonempty,
1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0 ≤
β
p1
p1 + p1(1− p1)β ≤ (1− p0)β
p1 ≤ β[(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)]
The only way this could hold is if (1− p0)− p1(1− p1) > 0, which happens when
p0 < 1 − p1 + p21. As p0 < p1 by assumption, the last inequality always holds, and
therefore the condition for D being non empty is:
p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1) ≤ β
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For E to be nonempty:
β
p1
≤ 1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
β ≤ p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
So again, E and D are mutually exclusive. One more comparison I want to show
is that indeed or B or C is always empty.
1
p1 − p0 ≤
1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0
p0(p1 − 1) ≤ (1− p1)2
Which always holds. Finally, analyzing the relationship between these two im-
portant thresholds for β,
1
p1 − p0 >
p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
1− p0 − p1 + p21 > p21 − p1p0
1 > p0(1− p1) + p1
Which always holds, for being the right-hand side a convex combination of some-
thing strictly lower than 1, and 1.
For a given effort level eh, the optimal contracts with moral hazard would exclude
the combination A-C-E-F but consider only A-B-E-F, A-B-D-F, and A-C-D-F.
In Figure 2 it is represented the contract with full information. As can be seen
in the derivation, this was done as if the principal and the agent were the same
single person. Also the two key betas have been labeled as β1 =
p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) and
β1 =
1
p1−p0 .
A.2 Moral Hazard and Unaware Principal
When the principal is unaware of the possibilities of the agent, she will offer a
contract with wh =
1
p1−p0 as the wage for a successful project, and w0 = 0 otherwise.
In the agent’s best response, this is exactly the division between (0, 0) and (1, 0),
and as the contour of the (0, 0) region is increasing, it happens that, for wh =
1/(p1 − p0) the agent never chooses (0, 0), independently of the value of β.
Moreover, by equalizing the frontier between (0, 1) and (1, 1) when β < β
1
,
we obtain the intervals for β for which the agent will exert (0, 1), (1, 1) and (1, 0)
respectively.
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1p1 − p0 =
1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
β˜ =
(p1 − p0)− (1− p0)(1− p1)
(p1 − p0)2
If β < β˜, the agent’s strategy is (0, 1), if β ≥ β˜, the agent’s strategy is (1, 1),
and if β > β1 the agent chooses (1, 0).
A.3 Moral Hazard
For the contract under moral hazard what was considered interim rationality con-
straint in the case with perfect information, is now an additional incentive compati-
bility. First, it is necessary that the agent accepts a wage that will make him choose
the strategy at t = 0 as decided the principal, but later it is further necessary that
after the first realization he sticks with that strategy. Again this would imply that
wh ≥ βeh for (eh, eh) and wh ≥ βehp1 for (0, eh), while the opposite should be true for
(eh, 0) and (0, 0) respectively.
The maximization problem for the principal is now:
max
wh,(e1,e2)
p(e1){yh − wh}+ e2[1− p(e1)]p(e1, 1){yh − wh}
s.t. p(e1)wh − e1 + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)wh − β} ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(eˆ1,eˆ2)
p(eˆ1)wh − eˆ1 + eˆ2[1− p(eˆ1)]{p(eˆ1, 1)wh − β}
The first constraint is the participation constraint that will make the agent to
sign the contract at t = 0. The second constraint is going to make the agent to
choose the strategy (e1, e2) that the principal desires.
The minimum necessary wage for each strategy, which satisfies all the constraints
is given by the solution to the problem under perfect information, recalling though
that the agent keeps only wh and not yh. The expected profits for each strategy for
the principal are:
We then can separate the three cases, each one of them represented in a column.
The most complex is the first column while the simplest is the second column.
1. β ≤ p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)
(a) (0, 0) versus (0, 1),
p0yh ≥
(
yh − β
p1
)
(p0 + (1− p0)p1)
β
(
p0 + p1(1− p0)
(1− p0)p21
)
≥ yh
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β ≤ p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)
p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) ≤ β ≤ 1p1−p0 1p1−p0 ≤ β
(0, 0) p0yh p0yh p0yh
(1, 0) - - p1
(
yh − 1p1−p0
)
(0, 1)
(
yh − βp1
)
[p0 + (1− p0)p1] - -
(1, 1) yh − 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)(1−p1) yh −
1+(1−p1)β
1−p0 yh − β
Table 3: Expected profits for principal for each feasible strategy according to β,
with moral hazard.
(b) (0, 1) versus (1, 1),
(
yh − β
p1
)
[p0 + (1− p0)p1] ≥ yh − 1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
yh ≤ 1
[(1− p0)(1− p1)]2 − ...
...− β
(1− p0)(1− p1)
[
p1 − p0
(1− p0)(1− p1) +
p0 + p1(1− p0)
p1
]
(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh − 1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1)
yh ≤ 1
(1− p0)2(1− p1) −
β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)2(1− p1)
The intersection of the constraints is at
β =
p21
−p20(p1 − 1)2 + p0(p21 − 3p1 + 1) + p1(p21 − p1 + 1)
2. p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) ≤ β ≤ 1p1−p0
This is achieved by comparing the two implementable contracts that are at
hand:
p0yh ≥ yh − 1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0
yh ≤ 1 + (1− p1)β
(1− p0)2
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3. 1
p1−p0 ≤ β
(a) (0, 0) versus (1, 0),
p0yh ≥ p1
(
yh − 1
p1 − p0
)
yh ≤ p1
(p1 − p0)2
(b) (1, 0) versus (1, 1),
p1
(
yh − 1
p1 − p0
)
≥ yh − β
yh ≤ β
1− p1 −
p1
(1− p1)(p1 − p0)
(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh − β
β
1− p0 ≥ yh
The intersection of the constraints is at,
β =
p1(1− p0)
(p1 − p0)2
A.3.1 With a Cash Unconstrained Agent
In this appendix, I will develop the model with moral hazard, but assuming that
the agent is no longer cash constrained.
The maximization problem for the principal is now:
max
(wh,w0),(e1,e2)
− w0 + p(e1){yh − (wh − w0)}+ e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)[yh − (wh − w0)]}
s.t. w0 − e1 + p(e1)(wh − w0) + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)(wh − w0)− β} ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(eˆ1,eˆ2)
w0 − eˆ1 + p(eˆ1)(wh − w0) + eˆ2[1− p(eˆ1)]{p(eˆ1, 1)(wh − w0)− β}
From where we can replace the participation constraint in the objective function
and the incentive compatibility constraint. We obtain the following maximization
problem:
max
(e1,e2)
− e1 + p(e1)yh + e2(1− p(e1))[p(e1, 1)yh − β]
Replacing the participation constraint in the first incentive compatibility cancels
all the terms, once the optimal must be in the arg max and therefore they should
coincide. As wh and w0, the principal will choose the effort levels such that the
objective function is satisfied, and therefore the effort choice will coincide with the
one in the case with full information. He then can adjust the wh and w0 to satisfy
all the constraints, in particular, the second incentive compatibility.
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B Externality
B.1 Full information
In this appendix we repeat the process followed for the baseline contract with full
information, but including the externality effect ξ. It will be clear that including
this externality will imply a shift to the left on the frontiers between strategies. For
space-saving reasons, I will omit several steps that are already clarified in Appendix
A.
The agent/principal will stick with a strategy involving e2 6= 0 if after observing
yˆ = 0 the return of exerting effort (again) is positive. In practical terms, the strategy
(0, eh) will be optimal after observing yˆ = 0, if and only if p1yh > βeh + ξ. In the
same way (eh, eh) will be optimal after observing yˆ = 0 if and only if yh > βeh + ξ.
From these two constraints, we obtain two critical values of yh:
β+ξ
p1
and β + ξ.
These critical points can be described in the diagram in figure 10.
0
(0, 0), (1, 0)
β + ξ
(0, 0), (1, 1)
β+ξ
p1
(0, 1), (1, 1)
yh
Figure 10: Strategies that can be implemented for different levels of yh.
Comparing the profits between each pair, we can find the intervals that are
relevant.
1. For the first interval (0, 0) versus (≥) (1, 0),
yh ≤ 1
p1 − p0
2. For the second interval (0, 0) versus (≥) (1, 1),
1 + (1− p1)(β + ξ)
1− p0 ≥ yh
3. For the final interval (0, 1) versus (≥) (1, 1),
1− (β + ξ)(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1) ≥ yh
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0(0, 0) (1, 0)
β + ξ
(0, 0) (1, 1)
β+ξ
p1
(0, 1) (1, 1)
yh1
p1−p0
1+(1−p1)[β+ξ]
1−p0
1−(β+ξ)(p1−p0)
(1−p0)(1−p1)
Figure 11: Strategies that can be implemented for different levels of yh.
The next step is to check if any of the strategy sets is empty.
Name the intervals from left to right as A, B, C, etc.
It is clear that set A is nonempty. For B to be nonempty, it is necessary that:
1
p1 − p0 ≤ β + ξ
For C to be nonempty it is necessary:
β + ξ ≤ 1
p1 − p0
From here we get that B and C are mutually exclusive sets. Now for D to be
nonempty,
p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1) ≤ (β + ξ)
For E to be non-empty:
β + ξ ≤ p1
(1− p0)− p1(1− p1)
So again, E and D are mutually exclusive.
For a given effort level eh, the optimal contracts with moral hazard would exclude
the combination A-C-E-F, but consider only A-B-E-F, A-B-D-F, and A-C-D-F.
In Figure 5 it is represented the contract with full information and the externality.
As can be seen in the derivation, this was done as if the principal and the agent were
the same single person. The two key betas have been labeled as βE1 =
p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)−
ξ and βE1 =
1
p1−p0−ξ. The superscript E means variables considering the externality.
B.2 Moral Hazard
The maximization problem for the principal is:
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max
wh,(e1,e2)
p(e1){yh − wh}+ e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)(yh − wh)− ξ}
s.t. p(e1)wh − e1 + e2[1− p(e1)]{p(e1, 1)wh − β} ≥ 0
(e1, e2) ∈ arg max
(eˆ1,eˆ2)
p(eˆ1)wh − eˆ1 + eˆ2[1− p(eˆ1)]{p(eˆ1, 1)wh − β}
The first constraint is the participation constraint that will make the agent to
sign the contract at t = 0. The second constraint is going to make the agent to
choose the strategy (e1, e2) that the principal desires. Finally, we will also require
interim rationality.
The minimum necessary wage for each strategy, which satisfies all the constraints
is given by the solution to the problem under full information, recalling though that
the agent keeps only wh and not yh. The expected profits for each strategy for the
principal are:
β ≤ p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)
p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) ≤ β ≤
1
p1−p0
1
p1−p0 ≤ β
(0, 0) p0yh p0yh p0yh
(1, 0) - - p1
(
yh − 1p1−p0
)
(0, 1)
(
yh − βp1
)
[p0 + (1− p0)p1]− (1− p0)ξ - -
(1, 1) yh − 1−β(p1−p0)(1−p0)(1−p1) − (1− p1)ξ yh −
1+(1−p1)β
1−p0 − (1− p1)ξ yh − β − (1− p1)ξ
Table 4: Expected profits for principal for each feasible strategy according to β,
with moral hazard.
We then can separate the three cases, each one of them represented in a column.
The most complex is the first column while the simplest is the second column.
1. β ≤ p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1)
(a) (0, 0) versus (0, 1),
p0yh ≥
(
yh − β
p1
)
(p0 + (1− p0)p1)− (1− p0)ξ
yh ≤ β
(
p0 + p1(1− p0)
(1− p0)p21
)
+
ξ
p1
(b) (0, 1) versus (1, 1),
(
yh − β
p1
)
[p0 + (1− p0)p1]− (1− p0)ξ ≥ yh − 1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1) − (1− p1)ξ
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yh ≤ 1
[(1− p0)(1− p1)]2 − ...
− β
(1− p0)(1− p1)
[
p1 − p0
(1− p0)(1− p1) +
p0 + p1(1− p0)
p1
]
− ...
− p1 − p0
(1− p0)(1− p1)ξ
(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh − 1− β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)(1− p1) − (1− p1)ξ
yh ≤ 1
(1− p0)2(1− p1) −
β(p1 − p0)
(1− p0)2(1− p1) +
1− p1
1− p0 ξ
The intersection of the constraints is at
β2
˜
=
p21 + [p1(1− p0)(1− p1){(1− p1)p1 − (1− p0)}]ξ
[p0 + (1− p0)p1](1− p0)(1− p1) + (p1 − p0)p21
2. p1
(1−p0)−p1(1−p1) ≤ β ≤ 1p1−p0
This is achieved by comparing the two implementable contracts that are at
hand:
p0yh ≥ yh − 1 + (1− p1)β
1− p0 − (1− p1)ξ
yh ≤ 1 + (1− p1)β
(1− p0)2 +
1− p1
1− p0 ξ
3. 1
p1−p0 ≤ β
(a) (0, 0) versus (1, 0),
p0yh ≥ p1
(
yh − 1
p1 − p0
)
yh ≤ p1
(p1 − p0)2
(b) (1, 0) versus (1, 1),
p1
(
yh − 1
p1 − p0
)
≥ yh − β − (1− p1)ξ
yh ≤ β
1− p1 −
p1
(1− p1)(p1 − p0) + ξ
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(c) (0, 0) versus (1, 1),
p0yh ≥ yh − β − (1− p1)ξ
β
1− p0 +
1− p1
1− p0 ξ ≥ yh
The intersection of the constraints is at,
β˜2 =
p1(1− p0)
(p1 − p0)2 − (1− p1)ξ
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